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 The	DODIG	identified	the	following	as	the	most	serious	management	and	performance	
challenges	facing	the	Department	in	FY	2012	in	the	DoD	Agency	Financial	Report	for	Fiscal	Year	
2012:	
Financial	Management:		
 Achieving	Financial	Statement	Audit	Readiness:	Although	the	Department	is	far	
from	reaching	an	unqualified	opinion	on	its	consolidated	financial	statements,	
the	Department	has	demonstrated	improvements.	Clearly,	DoD	senior	leadership	
has	placed	an	increased	emphasis	on	and	attention	to	addressing	challenges	in	
achieving	audit	readiness	of	its	financial	statements.	This	increased	attention	is	
essential	to	the	Department	meeting	its	own	internal	milestones	as	well	as	the	
2017	audit	readiness	mandate.	The	Department	continues	to	make	progress	
towards	meeting	the	2014	audit	readiness	goal	of	the	SBR;	however,	it	is	still	
uncertain	whether	the	Department	will	meet	the	2014	goal.	
 Modernizing	Financial	Systems	(Enterprise	Resource	Planning):		The	Department	
plans	to	spend	more	than	$15	billion	to	further	develop	and	implement	ERP	
systems.	These	ERP	systems	have	experienced	cost	increases	and	schedule	
delays	ranging	up	to	13	years.	Because	of	these	schedule	delays,	the	Department	
will	continue	using	outdated	legacy	systems	and	diminish	the	estimated	savings	
associated	with	transforming	business	operations	through	business	system	
modernization.	Schedule	delays	and	poorly	developed	and	implemented	ERP	
systems	also	increase	the	risks	that	the	SBR	will	not	be	auditable	by	September	
30,	2014,	and	the	goal	of	full	financial	statement	audit	readiness	by	September	
30,	2017.	
 Improper	Payments:		The	Department	lacks	assurance	that	the	billions	of	dollars	
in	payments	it	disburses	annually	are	made	correctly.	Simply	stated,	the	
Department	does	not	always	know	that	it	is	paying	the	right	person,	the	correct	
amount,	at	the	right	point	in	time.	
Acquisition	Processes	and	Contract	Management		
 Enhancing	the	Acquisition	Workforce:	The	Department	continues	to	struggle	with	
its	efforts	to	rebuild	an	acquisition	workforce	that	is	sufficient	in	size	and	
adequately	trained	and	equipped	to	oversee	DoD	acquisitions.		Previous	Defense	
budget	cuts	decimated	the	capability	of	the	acquisition	workforce.	
 Weapon	System	Acquisition:	oversight	and	pricing	continue	to	be	identified	as	
problems.		The	IG	states	that	the	Department	needs	to	prudently	evaluate	
contractors	in	the	fast‐paced	environment	of	war.	
 Contract	Management:		The	Department	continues	to	experience	inefficiencies	
and	wasteful	use	of	funds	in	its	contracting	efforts.		It	has	been	noted	that	the	
Department’s	increased	use	of	contractors	for	acquisition	support	shows	DoD’s	
shortcomings.		Annually,	$200	billion	are	spent	on	services	–	more	than	50%	of	
the	Department’s	contract	spending.			
 IT	Acquisition	System:		The	Department	has	recognized	that	it	needs	to	improve	
the	outcomes	of	its	acquisitions,	deliver	faster	capability,	and	save	billions	
through	cost	efficiencies.106	
	
Most	of	these	are	long‐standing	problems	that	pre‐date	creation	of	the	CMO	organization.	These	problems	
persist	and	there	is	little	to	be	seen	in	the	DODIG	reports	that	suggest	that	any	discernible	progress	is	
attributable	to	the	new	CMO	organization.	
	  
																																																																		
106	Office	of	the	Under	Secretary	of	Defense	(Comptroller)/Chief	Financial	Officer,	Department	of	Defense	Agency	Financial	Report	
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GAO Review and Intent  
What	has	GAO	said	about	the	DoD’s	implementation	of	the	CMO	concept	and	how	does	DoD’s	implementation	
appear	to	measure	up	to	GAO’s	initial	vision	for	a	Chief	Management	Officer	in	the	DoD?	These	questions	are	
explored	by	looking	at	structure	and	implementation,	leadership,	and	the	strategic	management	plan.	
Structure and Implementation 
Since	the	National	Defense	Authorization	Act	(NDAA)	2008	directive,	the	Office	of	the	Secretary	of	Defense	
(OSD)	and	three	service	components	have	organized	and	staffed	their	offices	of	business	transformation	
(OBT),	developed	comprehensive	plans	and	architecture,	and	have	embarked	on	business	transformation	
agendas.	But	the	GAO	is	quite	critical	of	the	DoD’s	fundamental	management	structure,	and	says	a	number	of	
GAO’s	recommendations	have	yet	to	be	heeded.		
	
Further	defining	the	roles	and	responsibilities	of	the	CMO	and	DCMO	positions	is	a	key	concern	of	the	GAO:	
“key	strategies	for	successful	implementation	of	the	CMO	position	include	defining	roles,	responsibilities,	
structures,	processes,	reporting	relationships	and	ensuring	a	high	level	of	authority.”107	While	the	FY07	and	
FY08	NDAAs	direct	the	creation	of	the	CMO	and	the	DCMO	positions	and	offer	guidance	on	the	roles	and	
responsibilities	of	these	positions,	the	GAO	consistently	finds	that	specific	authoritative	roles	need	to	be	
determined	for	the	incorporation	of	BT	into	long‐term	cultural	and	institutional	transformation.	
	
The	GAO	identifies	the	relationship	between	the	OSD	DCMO	office	and	the	service	component	CMO	OBTs	as	
an	area	that	requires	further	definition.		The	OSD	DCMO	addresses	defense‐wide	business	problems,	while	
the	component	CMOs	address	business	problems	within	the	military	departments.		The	DCMO’s	involvement	
in	service	initiatives	is	evidence	that	its	roles	and	responsibilities	should	be	increased,	or	at	least	clarified.		
According	to	the	GAO,	“neither	the	CMO	nor	the	DCMO	has	been	assigned	any	specific	role	for	integrating,	
monitoring	or	otherwise	institutionalizing	the	ongoing	efficiency	initiative.”108	The	primary	way	the	OSD	
DCMO	organization	could	currently	influence	the	BT	efforts	within	the	individual	services	is	through	advice	to	
the	Deputy	Secretary	of	Defense	(DEPSECDEF)	that	ultimately	becomes	policy,	or	through	the	Investment	
Review	Board	(IRB).	The	service	CMOs	receive	all	of	their	external	marching/rudder	orders	from	the	
DEPSECDEF	via	their	respective	service	secretaries.	The	amount	of	these	policies	originating	in	the	OSD	
DCMO	office	is	still	unclear.	Additionally,	as	DBSMC	Chairman,	the	DEPSECSEF	has	the	responsibility	of	
integrating	“all	activities	related	to	business	operations	and	performance	management	across	the	
Department.”109	
	
The	OSD	DCMO	within	DEPSECDEF’s	staff	has	no	programmatic	responsibility	over	the	service	CMOs,	but	
rather	plays	a	collaborator/consultant	role	with	the	component	CMOs.	The	decentralized	approach	decided	
on	by	the	DoD,	and	later	formalized	by	Congress,	allows	the	services	to	interpret	and	implement	BT	in	their	
own	ways.	This	may	or	may	not	be	a	benefit,	but	it	is	not	what	GAO	had	originally	envisioned.	By	DoD’s	
calculus,	to	have	given	centralized	control	of	BT	to	an	empowered	OSD	DCMO	would	have	imposed	a	common	
solution	to	highly	distinctive	and	independent	organizations.	Congress	seems	to	have	acceded	to	DoD’s	view.	
	
GAO	provides	an	example	of	the	limitations	of	the	CMO	concept	in	its	review	of	supply	chain	management	in	
DoD.	Supply	chain	management	made	the	High	Risk	List	“due	to	weakness	in	the	management	of	supply	
inventories	and	responsiveness	to	warfighter	requirements,	such	as	shortages	of	critical	items	during	the	
early	years	of	operations	in	Iraq.”	110		GAO’s	latest	report	acknowledges	that	DoD	has	developed	a	plan	to	
improve	inventory	management.	However,	“The	DoD	DCMO	stated	that	she	was	not	involved	with	developing	
																																																																		
107	Government	Accountability	Office,	Defense	Business	Transformation:	DoD	Needs	to	Take	Additional	Actions	to	Further	Define	Key	
Management	Roles,	Develop	Measurable	Goals,	and	Align	Planning	Efforts,	Briefing	for	Congressional	Committees,	GAO‐11‐181R	
(Washington,	DC:	GPO	2011),	January	26	2011,	3	
108	Government	Accountability	Office,	Defense	Business	Transformation:	DoD	Needs	to	Take	Additional	Actions	to	Further	Define	Key	
Management	Roles,	Develop	Measurable	Goals,	and	Align	Planning	Efforts,	Briefing	for	Congressional	Committees,	GAO‐11‐181R	
(Washington,	DC:	GPO	2011),	January	26,	2011,	29	
109	ODS	2012	p.	2	
110	Government	Accountability	Office,	High‐Risk	Series:	An	Update,	Report	to	Congressional	Committees,	GAO‐11‐278	(Washington,	
DC:	GPO	2011),	February	2011,	81	
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or	reviewing	this	plan.”111	There	are	two	points	that	are	revealed	through	this	example.	First,	business	
transformation	efforts	do	not	necessarily	involve	the	OSD	DCMO.	Second,	the	coordination	and	lines	of	
communication	throughout	the	DoD	OSD	and	component	CMO	offices	are	not	well	defined.	In	this	case,	the	
outcome	was	a	plan	for	improvement	of	supply	chain	management	issues,	but	without	proper	BT	leadership	
and	coordination,	the	DoD	is	susceptible	to	duplicated	or	overlapped	efforts,	as	well	as	the	lack	of	support	to	
see	initiatives	through.	By	clarifying	reporting	structures,	defining	relationships	and	roles	between	the	four	
offices,	and	strengthening	the	role	of	the	OSD	DCMO	beyond	that	of	a	consultant/collaborator,	business	
transformation	will	remain	vulnerable	to	duplicated	efforts	proper	and	the	lack	of	support	to	see	initiatives	
through	to	the	end.		
	
Table 3:  BT Leadership 
  Position 
Tenure 
Name  Background Brief Description of Career Background 
OSD 
CMO 
Presidential 
Appointee in 
a Position 
Requiring 
Senate 
Confirmation 
(PAS) 
Former 
Deputy 
Secretary 
of Defense, 
William J. 
Lynn III 
Policy/
Management  
 Deputy Secretary of Defense from 2009 to 2011, 
and led initiatives and efforts for cyber security, 
space strategy and energy policy. 
 Senior vice president at Raytheon Company 
focusing on strategic planning and government 
relations from 2002 to 2009. From 2001 to 2002, 
he served as executive vice president of DFI 
International consulting firm.  
 DoD Chief Financial Officer and Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller) from 1997 to 2001. 
 DoD Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation 
from 1993‐1997. 
 Served on Senator Edward Kennedy’s staff and 
oversaw work with the Senate Armed Service 
Committee.  
 Academic background in defense analysis, law, and 
public affairs.112 
  Presidential 
Appointee in 
a Position 
Requiring 
Senate 
Confirmation 
(PAS) 
Ashton 
Carter 
Policy/
Management 
 Former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics from 2009 to 2011 where 
he led management efforts to meet urgent 
operational needs.  
 Member of President Obama’s Government 
Accountability and Transparency Board. 
 Chair of the International and Global Affairs faculty, 
Director of the Center for Science International 
Affairs, and Chairman of the Editorial Board of 
International Security at Harvard University’s John 
F. Kennedy School of Government. Co‐Director of 
Preventive Defense Project.  
 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Policy during the Clinton Administration.  
 Academic background in physics, medieval history, 
and theoretical physics.113  
																																																																		
111	Government	Accountability	Office,	Defense	Business	Transformation:	DoD	Needs	to	Take	Additional	Actions	to	Further	Define	Key	
Management	Roles,	Develop	Measurable	Goals,	and	Align	Planning	Efforts,	Briefing	for	Congressional	Committees.	GAO‐11‐181R	
(Washington,	DC:	GPO	2011),	January	26,	2011,	35	
112	Tech	America	Foundation,	the	Honorable	William	J.	Lynn,	III.	2012	Vision	Conference,	October	17‐18,	2012,		
http://vision.techamericafoundation.org/william‐lynn‐bio/	(accessed	August	2012)	
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  Position 
Tenure 
Name  Background Brief Description of Career Background 
OSD 
DCMO 
Presidential 
Appointee in 
a Position 
Requiring 
Senate 
Confirmation 
(PAS) 
Elizabeth A. 
McGrath 
Management  Deputy Director for Systems Integration for the 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), 
where she strategized and executed a $1 billion 
dollar budget while managing the DoD’s financial 
systems.  
 Over 20 years of acquisition experience, as well as 
program management experience with DFAS and 
DON, financial and acquisition policy and regulation 
expertise. 
 Academic background in economics, program 
management, financial management, logistics and 
acquisition.114 
DON 
CMO 
Presidential 
Appointee in 
a Position 
Requiring 
Senate 
Confirmation 
(PAS) 
Robert O. 
Work  
Policy/
Military 
 Senior fellow for maritime affairs, then vice 
president for strategic studies for the Center for 
Strategic Budgetary Assessments.  
 US Marine Corps; over the span of 27 years, his 
work included positions in command, leadership 
and management.  
 Academic background in biology, systems 
management, space systems operations, and 
international public policy.115  
DON 
DCMO 
Non‐career 
Senior 
Executive 
Service (SES) 
Eric 
Fanning 
Policy   Deputy Director for the Commission on the 
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Proliferation and Terrorism.  
 Senior Vice President for Strategic Development at 
Business Executives for National Security.  
 Career history includes strategic communications, 
national and foreign assessments, defense research 
and political affairs.116  
DA CMO  Presidential 
Appointee in 
a Position 
Requiring 
Senate 
Confirmation 
(PAS) 
Dr. Joseph 
W. 
Westphal  
Policy  Chancellor of the University of Maine System, 
Professor of Political Science at the University of 
Maine, Provost and Senior Vice President for 
Research and Professor of Environmental Studies at 
the New School in New York City, Professor of 
Political Science and later head of the Department 
of Political Science at Oklahoma State University. 
 Acting Secretary of the Army for Civil Works from 
1998‐2001.  
 Senior Policy Advisor for Water Resources at the 
Environmental Protection Agency 
 Congressional experience with directing House and 
																																																																																																																																																																																																																				
113	Department	of	Defense,	Biography	of	Ashton	B.	Carter,	Deputy	Secretary	of	Defense,	
http://www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=186	(accessed	August	2012)	
114	Department	of	Defense,	Biography	of	Elizabeth	A.	McGrath:	Deputy	Chief	Management	Officer	for	Department	of	Defense,	
http://www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=219	(accessed	August	2012)	
115	Department	of	the	Navy,	Under	Secretary	of	the	Navy	Presents	the	Honorable	Robert	O.	Work.	U.S.	Department	of	the	Navy,	
America’s	Navy,	June	4,	2009.	http://www.navy.mil/navydata/bios/navybio.asp?bioID=507	(accessed	August	2012)	
116	Department	of	the	Navy,	Office	of	the	Under	Secretary	of	the	Navy,	Biography	of	Eric	Fanning:	Deputy	Under	Secretary	of	the	
Navy	and	Deputy	Chief	Management	Officer,	January	2012.	
http://www.public.navy.mil/donhr/executivemanagement/aboutseniorexecutives/Bios/Fanning,%20E.pdf	(accessed	August	
2012)	
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  Position 
Tenure 
Name  Background Brief Description of Career Background 
Senate bi‐partisan congressional caucus; budget 
analyst and assistant to the Chairman of US House 
Committee on the Budget; policy advisor for 
Secretary in the Department of the Interior.  
 Academic Background in political science.117  
DA 
DCMO 
Career SES 
(and 3 star 
general 
heading the 
BTO) 
Mark R. 
Lewis 
Policy   Chief of Plans Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Personnel.  
 Director of Plans, Resources, and Operations 
Directorate.  
 Special Assistant then Colonel, Executive Officer to 
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Army.  
 Assistant Director for Land Warfare, Office of 
Assistant SECDEF (Special Operations and Low‐
intensity Conflict).  
 Deputy Inspector General, Battalion Executive 
Officer and Divisions Operations Officer, 
Construction Program Analyst for the US Army 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management at 
Headquarters, US Army, Europe.  
 Academic background in operations research and 
systems analysis and armed forces industry.118  
DAF 
CMO 
Presidential 
Appointee in 
a Position 
Requiring 
Senate 
Confirmation 
(PAS) 
Former 
Under 
Secretary 
for the Air 
Force, Erin 
C. Conaton   
Policy  Currently serves as the Under Secretary for 
Personnel and Readiness and senior policy advisor 
to SECDEF and DEPSECDEF. 
 Staff Director and primary advisor of the US House 
of Representatives Committee on Armed Services.  
 Research Staff Director for the US Commission on 
National Security/21st Century which constructed a 
new national security strategy and 
recommendations for implementation.  
 Served with the CIA and the National Security 
Council as an analyst and as a Term Member for 
the Council on Foreign Relations.  
  Academic background in Foreign Service, law and 
diplomacy.119  
DAF 
CMO 
Presidential 
Appointee in 
a Position 
Requiring 
Senate 
Confirmation 
(PAS) 
Current 
Acting 
Under 
Secretary 
for the Air 
Force, Dr. 
Jamie M. 
Policy   Serves concurrently as the Assistant Secretary of 
the Air Force for Financial Management and 
Comptroller. 
 Lead analyst for US Senate Committee on the 
Budget for defense, intelligence and foreign affairs. 
 Advised Chairman of the Budget Committee on 
national security.  
 Economic development strategist for J.E. Austin 
																																																																		
117	Department	of	the	Army:	Official	Homepage	of	the	United	States	Army,	Biography	of	the	Honorable	Dr.	Joseph	W.	Westphal,	
Under	Secretary	of	the	United	States	Army.	U.S.	Department	of	the	Army,	September	13,	2011.	
http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/c/downloads/220204.pdf	(accessed	August	2012)	
118	US	House	of	Representatives	House	Armed	Services	Committee.	Biography	of	Mark	R.	Lewis,	Army	Deputy	Chief	of	Management	
Officer	(DCMO),	http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=b87b2bfe‐8d03‐4de3‐a4c5‐e875e42b6078	
(accessed	August	2012)	
119	Department	of	Defense	Personnel	and	Readiness,	Hon.	Erin	C.	Conaton,	Under	Secretary	of	Defense	for	Personnel	and	Readiness,	
http://prhome.defense.gov/bios/ErinConaton.aspx	(accessed	August	2012)	
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  Position 
Tenure 
Name  Background Brief Description of Career Background 
Morin   Associates and consulted projects for USAID 
 Academic background in Foreign Service, public 
administration and policy, defense budgeting and 
political science.120 
DAF 
DCMO 
Career SES  David 
Tillotson III  
Policy  Director, Policy, Planning and Resources, Office of 
the Chief of Warfighting Integration.  
 Deputy Chief, Warfighting Integration and Deputy 
Chief Information Officer, Office of the Secretary of 
the Air Force.  
 Director, Architecture and Operational Support 
Modernization, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Warfighting Integration.  
 System Program Director for the Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Integration 
Program Office.  
 Chief of Experimentation with the Integrated 
Command and Control System Program Office at 
the Electronic Systems Center at the Hanscom Air 
Force Base.  
 Deputy Mission Area Director, Information 
Dominance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 
Air Force for Acquisition. 
 Academic background in political science, 
international relations, program management, and 
defense.121  
Leadership  
The	GAO		argued	that	“essential	qualifications	for	a	COO/CMO	position	include	having	broad	management	
experience	and	a	proven	track	record	of	making	decisions	in	complex	settings	as	well	as	having	direct	
experience	in,	or	solid	knowledge	of,	the	respective	department	or	agency	[…].	We	have	suggested	that	the	
individual	serving	in	a	COO/CMO	position	be	selected	based	on	(1)	demonstrated	leadership	skills	in	
managing	large	and	complex	organizations	and	(2)	experience	achieving	results	in	strategic	planning,	
financial	management,	communications	and	information	resources	management,	human	capital	strategy,	
acquisition	management,	and	change	management.”122	The	GAO	advocated	the	establishment	of	a	separate	
and	distinct	CMO	position	at	the	Executive	Level	II	that	reports	to	the	Secretary	of	Defense	(SECDEF).	
Additionally,	GAO	recommended	a	non‐political	appointment	with	a	five	to	seven‐year	tenure	so	that	
business	transformation	efforts	and	agendas	can	withstand	political	turnover.	123		Instead,	the	NDAA	
assigned	the	CMO	responsibility	to	the	DEPSECDEF,	a	political	appointee,	adding	the	role	of	CMO	to	his	
myriad	other	responsibilities,	and	Congress	directed	that	the	DCMO	and	staff	support	the	DEPSECDEF’s	BT	
efforts	and	responsibilities.	
	
The	CMOs	and	DCMOs	in	the	Office	of	the	Secretary	of	Defense,	the	Department	of	the	Navy	(DON),	
Department	of	the	Army	(DA),	and	Department	of	the	Air	Force	(DAF)	come	from	various	positions	and	bring	
																																																																		
120	Department	of	the	Air	Force:	Official	Website	of	the	Air	Force,	Biography:	Dr.	Jamie	M.	Morin,	July	2012.		
http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=12523	(accessed	August	2012)	
121	Department	of	the	Air	Force:	The	Official	Website	of	the	Air	Force,	Biography:	David	Tillotson	III,	July	2012.		
http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=7395	(accessed	August	2012)	
122	Government	Accountability	Office,	Organizational	Transformation:	Implementing	Chief	Operating	Officer/Chief	Management	
Officer	Positions	in	Federal	Agencies,	GAO‐08‐34	(Washington,	DC:	GPO	2007),	November	2007,	4	
123	Government	Accountability	Office,	Defense	Business	Transformation:	Achieving	Success	Requires	a	Chief	Management	Officer	to	
Provide	Focus	and	Sustained	Leadership,	GAO‐07‐1072,	(Washington,	DC:	GPO	2007)	September	2007,	18	
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varied	knowledge	and	experience	to	the	respective	positions.	The	following	is	a	table	showing	the	position	
tenure,	names	of	current	or	previous	BT	leadership,	and	career	focus	and	history.		
	
While	bringing	diverse	experiences	to	the	jobs	of	CMO	and	DCMO,	it	would	appear	that	few	of	the	ten	people	
listed	above	have	the	kind	of	experience	or	background	envisioned	by	GAO	for	these	positions.	When	
Congress	codified	the	CMO	duties	in	the	deputy	secretary	and	service	undersecretaries,	it	acceded	to	the	
existing	DoD	structure	without	explicitly	stating	any	expectation	that	appointees	to	the	CMO	and	DCMO	
positions	would	have	significant	demonstrated	managerial	experience.		Nor	has	Congress	insisted	on	such	
experience	when	approving	nominees	for	Senate‐confirmed	positions.		As	shown	in	the	chart	above,	some	of	
the	appointees	since	2009	have	management	experience	but	most	are	more	closely	identified	with	careers	in	
policy	than	management	and	none	would	appear	to	have	the	significant	experience	leading	change	in	large	
organizations	as	envisioned	by	GAO.		Most	were	apparently	not	selected	primarily	to	meet	this	expectation	
and	the	Senate	clearly	did	not	insist	upon	it	when	considering	them	for	confirmation.		
Strategic Management Plan ‐‐ Measuring Progress 
	The	DoD’s	Strategic	Management	Plan	(SMP)	was	established	in	2008	and	is	updated	annually,	which	the	
GAO	views	as	an	improvement.	In	January	2011,	the	GAO	recommended	the	DoD	not	only	further	define	its	
SMP	goals,	but	also	attach	quantifiable	measurements	of	success	to	those	goals.	According	to	the	GAO,	the	
DoD	is	in	the	early	phases	of	consensually	evaluating	progress	and	has	yet	to	fully	identify	and	define	
procedures,	milestones,	and	internal	mechanisms	across	the	OSD	and	military	components	to	guide	and	
monitor	progress.124		To	continue	working	towards	strengthening	and	further	establishing	the	SMP,	the	GAO	
recommends	that	the	OSD	CMO,	DCMO	and	the	service	component	CMOs	align	“business	priorities,	
coordinate	review	and	approval	of	updates	to	plans,	synchronize	the	development	of	plans	with	the	budget	
process,	and	monitor	the	implementation	of	reform	initiatives,	and	report	progress,	on	a	periodic	basis,	
towards	achieving	established	goals.”125		
Discussion 
This	is	necessarily	an	interim	report	in	the	sense	that	operation	of	the	CMO	function	in	DoD	is	an	ongoing	
activity.		The	foregoing	contains	descriptions	of	the	structure,	agendas	and	accomplishments	to	date	of	the	
DoD	and	service	component	CMO/organizations	largely	as	reported	by	them.	These	descriptions	are	followed	
by	a	review	of	recent	views	of	Congress,	GAO	and	the	DODIG	on	both	the	implementation	of	the	CMO	mandate	
and	also	on	the	condition	of	relevant	areas	of	defense	management.	These	reviews	suggest	that	though	the	
organizational	and	documentary	requirements	of	the	CMO	are	being	met,	issues	of	Defense	management	
transformation	persist.	In	this	section	we	address	some	of	the	issues	that	appear	relevant	to	this	argument.	
Structure and Implementation 
In	terms	of	organizational	reform,	the	DoD	and	service	components	have	each	established	the	leadership	
positions	of	the	CMO	and	DCMO,	established	offices	for	business	transformation	and	staffed	those	offices.	
Each	has	developed	a	strategic	management	plan	and	provided	required	annual	reports	and	occasional	
testimony	to	Congress.	But	neither	the	organizational	structure	nor	the	strategic	management	plan	is	the	
ultimate	goal.		The	GAO	views	these	as	essential	building	blocks	to	achieving	desired	outcomes.		An	
examination	of	the	SMPs	reveals	an	encyclopedic	review	of	management	improvement	initiatives,	process	
and	practices	inside	DoD.	But	it	is	unclear	whether	this	amounts	simply	to	a	collection	of	existing	DoD	
management	initiatives	or	if	the	SMPs	actually	guide	management	transformation	planning	or	decision	
making.	GAO	has	been	pushing	for	better	management	in	DoD	through	a	CMO	since	at	least	2005	and	the	
beginnings	of	CMO	structures	date	at	least	to	2007	or	earlier.	GAO	and	Congress	are	likely	to	become	more	
impatient	as	they	look	to	DoD	to	move	beyond	setting	up	staff	positions	and	writing	plans	and	actually	start	
achieving	measureable	results.	
																																																																		
124	Government	Accountability	Office,	Defense	Business	Transformation:	DoD	Needs	to	Take	Additional	Actions	to	Further	Define	Key	
Management	Roles,	Develop	Measurable	Goals,	and	Align	Planning	Efforts,	Briefing	for	Congressional	Committees,	GAO‐11‐181R	
(Washington,	DC:	GPO	2011),	January	26,	2011,	4	
125	Government	Accountability	Office,	Defense	Business	Transformation:	DoD	Needs	to	Take	Additional	Actions	to	Further	Define	Key	
Management	Roles,	Develop	Measurable	Goals,	and	Align	Planning	Efforts,	Briefing	for	Congressional	Committees,	GAO‐11‐181R	
(Washington,	DC:	GPO	2011),	January	26,	2011,	5	
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Goals, Management Agendas and Accomplishments 
It	is	similarly	difficult	to	identify	management	improvements	in	DoD	and	the	service	components	
that	can	be	attributed	to	the	CMO.	The	management	agendas	of	the	CMO/DCMO	organizations	seem	
more	to	be	compilations	of	pre‐existing	management	agendas,	re‐assembled	under	CMO.	For	
instance,	while	it	is	notable	that	one	DoD	item,	security	clearances,	has	been	removed	from	the	GAO	
high	risk	list,	that	work	began	long	before	the	OSD	DCMO	was	designated	and	was	an	interagency	
effort.	And	the	BTA	originated	the	solution	to	Cash	off	the	Battlefield.	The	Task	Force	for	Business	
and	Stability	Operations	was	the	driver	of	the	effort,	and	the	BTA	did	the	work	on	WAWF.	126	It	is	not	
clear	that	these	and	other	claimed	accomplishments	listed	would	not	have	been	achieved	under	prior	
organizations	or	initiatives.		
Systems Focus 
Given	the	large	number	of	expensive	business	systems	in	the	Department,	the	BPR	and	IRB	processes	
consume	much	of	the	DCMO’s	agenda.	The	CMO’s	heavy	focus	on	systems	and	business	process	
engineering	(BPR)	appears	to	be	mostly	a	continuation	of	previously	begun	initiatives	with	
persistent	problems	in	coordination	and	implementation.	The	DCMO	plans	to	finish	mapping	E2E	
processes	like	Procure‐to‐Pay	(P2P)	and	Hire‐to‐Retire	(H2R)	by	the	end	of	FY	2012,	and	will	then	
identify	the	next	two	processes	to	map	in	FY	2013.		If	so,	this	does	raise	questions	of	timing	and	
usefulness.		Mapping	P2P	and	H2R	began	in	2010	and	is	still	not	finished,	with	two	more	scheduled	
to	begin	in	2013.	Not	only	is	this	a	time	consuming	process	but	it	raises	the	question	of	how	useful	it	
is	for	the	Department	if	other	transformation	programs	are	all	well	underway.		For	instance,	what	
models	are	being	used	if	these	aren’t	available	yet	and	what	value	will	this	mapping	provide	if	the	
programs	complete	their	baseline	implementations	under	non‐standard	models?	Moreover,	most	of	
DoD’s	business	process	weaknesses	are	associated	with	the	gaps	that	occur	between	organizations	
and	functional	areas	that	reflect	the	legacy	systems	environment	and	at	least	some	ERP	
implementation	has	been	characterized	by	insufficient	attention	to	BPR,	thus	embedding	old	
processes	in	new	systems,	and	sometimes	a	reluctance	to	part	with	legacy	systems.127		
	
Additionally,	some	claimed	accomplishments	appear	to	be	premature.	For	instance,	OSD	has	
essentially	directed	the	Air	Force	to	forego	the	plans	for	ECSS	because	the	program	was	not	making	
sufficient	progress	and	Air	Force’s	clean	audit	opinion	are	only	opinions	using	examination	
procedures,	as	compare	with	the	more	traditional	opinions	on	the	financial	statements	themselves.	
	
The	focus	on	systems	places	a	lot	of	the	burden	for	management	transformation	in	DoD	on	successful	
ERP	implementation.	But	there	are	other	factors	that	need	addressing	as	well,	including	long	
standing	cultural	issues,	financial	management	practices,	and	decision‐making	processes.	It	is	not	
clear	that	these	issues	are	getting	much	attention	compared	to	the	energy	and	resources	put	into	
systems	modernization.	
Other Duties as Assigned 
Lastly,	it	appears	that	the	DCMO	organizations	also	function	as	staff	elements	for	the	Under	Secretaries	and	
can	be	diverted	into	dealing	with	other	short‐term	priorities.	For	instance,	The	Navy	DCMO	was	charged	at	
least	twice	with	developing	proposals	to	meet	Secretary	Gates’	budget	efficiency	initiative.	While	this	was	
important	work	it	put	the	DCMO	into	the	normal	PPBES	budget	cycle	rather	than	attending	to	long‐term	
management	efficiencies.	
																																																																		
126	Former	BTA	official	statement	to	author,	October	2012.	
127	Lee,	K.,	“Procure‐to‐Pay:	Measuring	Outcome	Beyond	Efficiency	Gains,”	The	Everest	Group,	July	5	2011.	
http://www.everestgrp.com/2011‐07‐procure‐to‐pay‐measuring‐outcome‐beyond‐efficiency‐gains‐sherpas‐in‐blue‐shirts‐
5563.html	(accessed	March	2012).	The	Everest	Group	acknowledges	that	technology‐driven	benefits	are	typically	realized	later	
because	of	lengthy	system/tool	selection	and	implementation	processes.	For	instance,	in	the	private	sector,	mapping	out	a	
Procure‐to‐Pay	(P2P)	system	entails	objectives	that	have	corresponding	outcome	metrics	and	diagnostic	measures.		Metrics	
measure	and	lead	to	the	evaluation	of	efficiency	and	effectiveness	through	quantified	data.	The	diagnostic	measures	are	areas	
where	procedures	are	drawn	out	at	the	operational	level	to	evaluate	what	areas	need	to	be	enhanced	or	amended.	
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Is a Chief Management Officer Really Needed in the DoD? 
This	study	provides	a	review	DoD’s	response	to	GAO’s	recommendation	that	a	chief	management	officer	is	
needed	in	DoD	to	advance	an	effective	management	reform	agenda.	DoD,	in	turn	has	implemented	the	
resulting	congressional	mandate	by	establishing	the	functions	and	offices	of	the	Chief	Management	Officer	
and	Deputy	Chief	Management	Officer.		Offices	of	business	transformation	have	been	established	and	staffed	
and	the	required	management	plans	and	reports	have	been	produced.	Some	new	processes	for	dealing	with	
management	issue	have	been	devised	and	some	accomplishments	are	claimed.	Yet,	GAO,	Congress	and	the	
DODIG	find	on‐going	lapses	in	DoD’s	business	management	and	they	are	critical	of	DoD’s	management	
improvement	efforts.	DoD	has	been	effective	at	the	organizational	aspects	of	implementing	CMO	but	the	
objective	of	accelerating	management	improvement	still	seems	elusive.	This	leads	to	the	question	of	whether	
the	GAO’s	prescription	was	the	right	medicine.	
	
Is	a	new	organization	in	DoD,	involving	CMOs	and	DCMOs	and	BTOs	the	answer	to	accelerating	and	sustaining	
management	improvement	in	DoD?	In	a	review	of	a	2008	GAO	report	on	the	topic,	Candreva	and	Brook	
question	whether	the	recommendation	for	a	CMO	is	evidence‐based:	“There	are	no	works	cited	from	the	
change	management	or	organizational	behavior	literature	[…]	and	no	evidence	about	the	effectiveness	of	
CMOs	offered	from	other	government	or	private	sector	organizations.”128	The	examples	from	the	IRS,	MIT	
and	Justice	Department	shown	earlier	in	this	report	indicate	one	key	organizational	issue.	In	each	of	these	
cases,	the	chief	administrative	officer	has	direct	managerial	authority	over	and	responsibility	for	the	various	
business	operations	of	the	organization	–	budget	and	finance,	human	resources,	informational	technology,	
facilities,	etc.	Only	in	the	most	abstract	way	do	the	policy	positions	of	deputy	secretary	and	the	service	
undersecretaries	have	supervisory	authority	over	business	management	functions	inside	DoD.	They	may	set	
managerial	policies,	lead	governance	bodies	or	even	make	major	acquisition	decisions,	but	day	to‐day	
management	of	the	business	functions	of	defense	is	dispersed	widely	throughout	the	Department.	Thus,	
GAO’s	organizational	proposal	for	fixing	DoD’s	management	problems	may	have	been	lacking	in	both	
evidence	and	design.	Deeply	rooted	complex	cultural	and	organizational	behavioral	issues	cannot	be	solved	
with	a	purely	organizational	solution,	notwithstanding	that	Congress	and	GAO	perceive	they	have	the	
leverage	to	force	change	in	this	manner.	
	
Regardless	of	the	questionable	validity	of	GAO’s	original	recommendation,	Congress	did	not	enact	the	long‐
term,	non‐political	chief	management	officer	that	GAO	envisioned.	Instead,	Congress	essentially	accepted	
DoD’s	counter‐argument	and	defaulted	to	the	existing	DoD	organization,	assigning	the	CMO	responsibilities	to	
the	deputy	secretary	and	service	undersecretaries	and	creating	business	transformation	offices	under	them.		
The	result	appears	to	be	that	the	new	CMO/DCMO	organizations	consist	mainly	of	a	re‐shuffling	of	existing	
offices	under	new	governance	structures	made	up	of	the	same	senior	Pentagon	participants	from	the	
secretariats	and	military	staffs.		
	
Associated	with	this	organizational	continuity	is	the	continuity	of	most,	if	not	all	of	the	DoD’s	management	
improvement	initiatives.		The	portfolios	of	the	CMO/DCMOs	seem	to	be	continuations	of	prior	initiatives.	The	
Department	has	essentially	co‐opted	the	CMO	idea	and	enveloped	it	into	its	existing	organization,	attending	
to	its	own	management	reform	agenda,	albeit	complying	with	congressional	organizational	and	reporting	
mandates.		
	
It	is	difficult	to	discern	any	new	management	transformation	agendas	that	can	be	attributed	to	the	new	CMO	
structure.		Nor	is	there	any	particular	coherence	in	the	management	reform	agendas	of	the	OSD	and	service	
component	CMOs.	This	suggests	the	possibility	that	the	CMO	organizations	could	carve	out	a	specific	new	
agenda	focused	on	GAO	high	risk	list.		Of	course,	the	CMO	goal	is	not	simply	to	get	DoD	removed	from	the	
high	risk	list.		The	goal	is	to	achieve	dramatic	improvements	in	operational	performance,	data	reliability,	
management	information,	efficiency,	and	operational	performance	in	the	business	area.		But	one	objective	
supports	the	other.	Meaningful	reforms,	once	implemented,	will	result	in	removal	from	the	high	risk	list	and	
working	toward	removal	from	the	high	risk	list	will	necessarily	require	meaningful	reforms.		
	
																																																																		
128	Philip	J.	Candreva	and	Douglas	A.	Brook,	“Transitions	in	Defense	Management	Reform:	A	Review	of	the	Government	
Accountability	Office’s	Chief	Management	Officer	Recommendation	and	Comments	for	a	New	Administration,”	Public	
Administration	Review,	68	(6)	November‐December	2008:	1044.	
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In	seeking	attributable	results,	perhaps	the	CMO	organizations	might	consider	getting	items	removed	from	
the	high	risk	list	as	a	more	explicit	goal.		The	DoD	items	on	the	GAO	high	risk	list	are	in	the	following	
categories.	
	
 									DoD	Approach	to	business	transformation		
 									DoD	Business	Systems	Modernization	
 									DoD	Support	Infrastructure	Management	
 									DoD	Financial	Management	
 									DoD	Supply	Chain	Management	
 									DoD	Weapon	Systems	Acquisition		
 									DoD	Contract	Management		
	
Some	might	argue	that	the	goal	of	the	CMO	reform	is	not	simply	to	reduce	DoD’s	presence	on	the	high	
risk	list	but	rather	to	achieve	major	improvement	in	its	management	practices.	If	those	
improvements	are	realized	the	reductions	in	the	high	risk	list	will	follow.	Other	argue	persuasively	
that	targeting	the	high	risk	list	would	give	DoD	identifiable	management	improvement	goals	which	
can	endure	through	leadership	transitions	and	against	which	progress	can	be	measured	and	
reported.	
	
Finally,	both	GAO	and	Congress	have	essentially	offered	an	organizational	solution	to	the	problem	of	defense	
management.		It	is	not	clear	why	an	organizational	change	will	necessarily	generate	better	decisions	or	
greater	change	from	the	same	participants	dealing	with	the	same	persistent	management	issues	in	the	same	
cultural	environment.	What	is	the	value	of	organizational	and	process	changes	if	the	problems	of	defense	
management	are	arguably	not	organizational	or	process	problems?		Management	problems	persist	in	DoD	
after	successive	waves	of	reorganization,	new	governance	bodies,	reports	and	assessments.		Perhaps	the	way	
DoD	does	business	is	behavioral	and	cultural	–	in	which	case	organizational	and	process	solutions	are	
misapplied.	On	the	other	hand,	if	the	CMO	medicine	is	the	proper	prescription,	and	acknowledging	Elizabeth	
McGrath’s	comments	about	the	size	and	complexity	of	DoD	and	the	time	required	to	institutionalize	change,	
more	tangible	and	measurable	results	beyond	staffing,	organization,	assessments	and	models	must	be	
perceived	as	forthcoming.	If	so,	the	DoD	may	expect	continuing	interest	by	GAO	and	Congress	in	prescribing	
solutions	to	the	Department’s	management	problems.		
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